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Ottawa’s Interference Inquiry jolted with second Diaspora boycott

Posted By April 10, 2024 No Comments

Hong Kong and Uyghur immigrant groups fear legal standing of several Chinese Canadian politicians; Hong Kong group also questions Commissioner Hogue’s ties to Liberal PMs

(Written by Sam Cooper. Originally published here in The Bureau, republished with permission.)

Canada’s Foreign Interference Commission faces intensifying credibility concerns as a Hong Kong immigrant group becomes the second diaspora group to boycott Ottawa’s examination into Chinese interference, based on concerns that several politicians “suspected of ties to Chinese Consulates” were awarded legal standing by Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue.

In addition to publishing a statement to the Commission citing “concerns over its objectivity and security integrity,” Hong Kong Canadian boycott spokesperson Ivy Li personally questioned Commissioner Hogue’s own professional links to former Liberal prime ministers Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chrétien.

In late January, the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project (URAP) pulled out of the inquiry, accusing Commissioner Hogue of enabling “a significant security risk” to the diaspora in Canada and their families in China.

URAP spokesman Mehmet Tohti said his group could not participate because two Toronto-area Liberal politicians — MP Han Dong and former Ontario MPP and current Markham Deputy Mayor Michael Chan — were given full standing, meaning their lawyers will be able to question other participants in the proceedings.

In its statement Tuesday, Canadian Friends of Hong Kong named these same politicians and also added Senator Yuen Pau Woo — granted intervener status by Hogue — to the list.

“We have grave concerns regarding the objectivity and the security integrity of the Foreign Interference Commission Inquiry, primarily due to standing being granted to individuals suspected to have strong ties to the Chinese Consulates, and their proxies,” the statement says.

It argues the inquiry’s scope, which also includes looking into election interference threats from Russia and India, risks exposing sensitive information on Canadian activism and security measures, which could enable hostile states to devise more effective interference operations.

The Bureau has asked Hogue to respond to these concerns and also spokeswoman Ivy Li’s questioning of Hogue’s own professional relationships.

In her personal statement, Li said “we didn’t believe the Inquiry would be a fair and independent process because of the Commissioner’s background.”

“Judge Hogue and her counsel are lacking expertise in how Chinese Communist Party thinks and operates,” Li said, “[so] they will easily be manipulated in the whole process by Chinese Communist Party proxies.”

Li added that Hogue’s previous work in a Quebec law firm alongside Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chrétien — two prime ministers seen as most prominently responsible for forging deep political and business ties between the Chinese Communist regime and federal Liberals and related eastern Canadian industrialists — raised questions for Canadian Friends of Hong Kong.

“Judge Hogue had worked alongside former Liberal Prime Ministers Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Jean Chrétien,” Li said. “We questioned how impartial Judge Hogue could be. Then the standing issue came along and we have more and more serious concerns, that’s why we would like to reaffirm our decision publicly.”

The Commission is currently on a break after hearing an initial round of testimony in February, and a spokesman hasn’t yet responded to The Bureau’s questions for this story.

The Bureau previously published two stories regarding Senator Woo’s standing in the inquiry and his repeated meetings with community leaders in Vancouver with overt ties to Chinese Communist agencies involved in espionage and interference activities, including Beijing’s united front and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.

These same community leaders and groups with ties to Beijing agencies are the focus of CSIS’s investigations into Chinese election interference, according to The Bureau’s national security sources and documents.

Canadian Friends of Hong Kong cited The Bureau’s exclusive reporting on Woo, which is of interest to Department of Justice lawyers in Ottawa that are working on laws to protect diaspora groups from hostile state interference.

“Senator Woo has earlier distorted the Foreign Influence Registry Act tabled by former MP Kenny Chiu and equated it to the horrendous and long abolished Chinese Exclusion Act,” the group’s boycott statement says. “In a private briefing, Woo has also been alleged of promising to shield Beijing’s “United Front” affiliates in Canada from critical scrutiny for taking pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stand.”

Perhaps the most consequential statement of the Hong Kong Canadian group’s boycott is urging for “fellow Canadians, particular those in the CCP victim communities, to exercise extreme caution and not to participate in the Inquiry unless the risks involved have been credibly and adequately addressed.”

The group also cited support from experts on Chinese and Russian interference operations including disinformation expert Marcus Kolga.

“As a victim of transnational repression, I believe that it’s critically important that we take a step back and ensure that the individuals and groups that are participating in the inquiry are properly vetted,” Kolga said, “and that any allegations of connections with foreign authoritarian governments be fully investigated before allowing them to handle any materials or interact with witnesses.”

Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, a former Canadian federal official, added: “It is a sign of the serious missteps of this inquiry that a second diaspora group, after the Uyghur-Canadians, is concerned about the risks of exposing their own sensitive evidence of intimidation by Beijing to three individuals accused of having close ties to the CCP.”

Charles Burton, a sinologist and former Canadian diplomat, said diaspora groups are rightly concerned about facing questions that “could compromise their safety and endanger family in China.”

“The Commission’s yawning lack of competent expertise on Chinese Communist Party operations in Canada does not inspire confidence,” he said.

And Scott McGregor, a former Canadian military and police intelligence analyst who has briefed Canadian officials on China’s and Iran’s threats to diaspora communities through transnational organized crime networks, raised questions of political influence from Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on the inquiry process.

“Without the ability to hold a classified inquiry by unbiased agencies — CBSA, CSIS and RCMP are junior ministries under Public Safety which is controlled politically by the Liberal PM — there is a real and present danger of providing our adversaries with information that will be used against us,” McGregor said.

sam@thebureau.news

Editor’s Note: In a response to The Bureau after this story was published the Commission stated:

The Commission acknowledges the position taken by this organization, which did not seek standing before the Commission.

The Commission continues to work in collaboration with the many groups representing diasporas who have chosen to participate in its work.  They bring a necessary perspective to the discussion about foreign interference in Canadian democracy, and their input and participation is essential to our work. We invite other diaspora members and groups to contribute to the important work of the Commission.

The Commission has created measures to protect those who wish to share information with the Commission but fear they may experience negative consequences if they are seen to be assisting the Commission. These protections include:

  1. A confidential email address (conf@pifi-epie.gc.ca), which can be used to send information to the Commission on a confidential basis. The Commission has put strict controls in place to protect the confidentiality of any information provided through this email address and the identity of the person or group providing the information.
  2. The ability, in appropriate circumstances, to redact sensitive information from documents before they are provided to the Commission or before they are circulated to some or all of the Participants and the public.
  3. The option, where personal security is an issue, of testifying and producing documents in camera (i.e., without the presence of anyone other than the Commission’s lawyers and the Commissioner), so that evidence will not be accessible to some or all of the Participants and/or the public.

Together, these measures will provide protection for those who fear consequences for assisting the Commission’s investigation, while respecting principles of fundamental justice on which Canadian society is founded.