The United Kingdom is a country that has experienced the destructive nature of ‘homegrown’ radicalization more than most – the 7/7 London bombings, the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, and the exportation of hundreds of UK citizens who have pledged allegiance and joined the Islamic State. Additionally, numerous Islamist terrorist plots designed to wreak havoc on the streets of Britain have been successfully foiled by the country’s security services. The government’s newly-published ‘Prevent’ strategy demonstrates its acknowledgement of the serious threat posed to national security by domestic extremism. Indeed, Prime Minister David Cameron has described the task of defeating Islamic radicalism as the “struggle of our generation”.[1]
The government’s new counter-radicalization strategy can be broken down and compartmentalized into four sections: confronting Islamist ideology, tackling both the ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’, emboldening the Muslim community, and building a cohesive society. This multi-faceted approach will seek to promote ‘British liberal values’, deglamorize the Islamic State, empower media regulators to censor radical content broadcasted on foreign channels, introduce stronger governance of faith schools, and boost ethnic-minority employment outcomes. These are all reasonable and well-intentioned aspirations, but has the government correctly identified the areas to target?
Schmid’s three-level analysis
An efficient method of examining Islamic radicalization in the UK is through the application of a multi-level framework – such as the one constructed by counter-radicalization expert Alex Schmid. Schmid provides a three-level examination of radicalization processes – the micro-level (individual and community-level influences), the meso-level (‘environmental enablers’), and the macro-level (‘host’ country policy actions).[2]What this multi-level form of examination allows is to locate where potential ‘facilitator’ points reside, to identify the actors which are heavily involved in the wider radicalization process and the ‘level’ where specific counter-radicalization responses need to be made.
Individual and neighbourhood-level factors (micro-level influences)
Individual-level radicalization processes may relate to the ‘identity crisis’ experienced by a number of second-generation Muslim migrants in the UK – predominantly young British males of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin. Often is the case that such individuals suffer from a lack of belonging to both the ‘host’ society and their country of origin – leaving them with identities devoid of meaningful content.[3] The absence of cultural attachment and psychological isolation from both Britain and their country of origin has led to some British Muslims identifying with a global Islamic community (Ummah), expressing solidarity with Islamic victims of war across the world. This fragile condition of ‘disembeddedness’[4], when exploited through the anti-imperialistic terminology peddled by religious fundamentalists, leaves such rootless individuals susceptible to radicalization.[5]
What is also important to analyze are the composition of social networks and relationships of British Muslims – particularly within the sizeable Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. The insular character of community-level groups and networks can contribute to a state of ‘identity readiness’[6] conducive to radicalization processes. This is particularly relevant if there is a genuine lack of exposure to the wider society due to limited interaction with others outside their own ethno-religious grouping.
2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study figures indicate that the social networks and relationship ties of individuals within the Muslim-dominant British Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities are overwhelmingly ‘co-ethnic’. Fifty-eight per cent of British Pakistani respondents stated that their friends were mainly co-ethnic, while the figure for British Bangladeshis was only slightly lower at 57%. Both exceeded the overall ethnic-minority figure of 51%. Social integration can also be measured through ‘inter-ethnic’ marital ties and intimate relationships.[7] British Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents exceeded the 90% general ethnic-minority figure for having a co-ethnic partner – 96% and 98% respectively.
Furthermore, and arguably most crucially, both communities in question reported relatively high levels of ‘residential segregation’. Twenty-six per cent of British Bangladeshis stated that their neighbours were predominantly co-ethnic, while the figure for British Pakistanis stood at 38% – double the overall ethnic-minority percentage of 19%. What these figures collectively indicate is that a considerable proportion of British Bangladeshis and Pakistanis possess social relationships and community-level networks which are intensely co-ethnic – meaning there is limited opportunity for meaningful ‘inter-ethnic’ interaction.[8]
This is inherently problematic due to the ‘mono-religious’ character of the British Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, reporting Islamic affiliation rates of 98% and 97% respectively in the 2010 EMBES survey.[9] With social networks being predominantly ‘co-ethno-religious’ within a majority ‘white non-Muslim’ country, feelings of unease, suspicion, and hostility can begin to characterize majority-minority dynamics. Among young British Muslims, this is a particular problem if they also perceive themselves to be treated unfairly or discriminated against by state institutions or private employers – with radical extremists capitalizing on this psychology of victimhood.
There is considerable evidence to support the idea that feelings of injustice are rife within the British Muslim population. A major British Broadcasting Corporation survey conducted by polling organization ComRes showed that 45% of British Muslims aged 18-34 believed that the UK was becoming less tolerant of Muslims, with 48% within this age cohort also feeling that prejudice against Islam created difficulties for Muslims living in the country.[10] 2010 EMBES figures showed that 71% of British Pakistanis and 70% of British Bangladeshis felt that opportunities needed to improve for minorities in general, with corresponding percentages of 28% and 37% arguing that minorities should even be given priority – presumably to compensate for perceived embedded discrimination.[11]
The issue here is not so much whether the discrimination is ‘real’ or simply ‘perceived’, but rather the stark reality that there is widespread feeling of being treated as ‘second-class citizens’ within the British Muslim population. Indeed, this can be a source of angst and frustration that can contribute heavily to identity crises which are often implicated in radicalization processes. Referring to social psychology, there have been suggestions that minority recipients of perceived discrimination may react by ‘offloading’ frustration through more aggressive channels of expression – such as joining extremist organizations.[12]
The role of British government (macro-level)
The two main policy approaches to integrate ethnic minorities, assimilation and multiculturalism, have both been implemented in Europe – with significant difficulties. The universalistic rigidities of secular French republicanism have undoubtedly contributed to the cultural marginalization of Muslims in France, with policies underpinned by the principles of ‘non-distinction’ and ‘colour-blindness’ inadvertently hampering societal integration outcomes for Islamic minorities.[13] The ‘alternative’ multicultural school of integrationist thought has been practiced in the UK. Britain has traditionally been viewed as a politically ‘multicultural’ nation – an ideal-typical model of state-sponsored multiculturalism in Europe – the ‘plural state’.[14]
The British pluralistic model of integration however has faced growing criticism for its supposed failure to successfully integrate Muslim-dominant minorities into mainstream society. The active state-sponsored promotion of ‘cultural maintenance’ and ‘minority difference’ in the UK has been blamed for the creation of “parallel societies” and “ethnicized silos” that have made the country a socially segregated nation. British Muslims leading both psychologically and residentially segregated lives from the mainstream are often located in ‘ghettoized diaspora communities’[15] – characterized by high unemployment, poor public services and delinquency.
The important point to draw from here is that inefficient economic and social integration outcomes are heavily linked to marginalization along religious and/or cultural lines. Young British Muslims ‘trapped’ within the confines of ‘ethnic enclaves’ do not have the social connections to pursue meaningful economic opportunities in the wider economy. Rather, they are often left to seek employment within the ‘mini-economy’ of their ethnic enclaves – opportunities both limited in number and generally located at the ‘lower rungs’ of the national wage scale.
Key employment figures for British Pakistani and Bangladeshi males during this decade indicate serious problems regarding labour market access and integration. The 2011 UK Census showed that of those in employment, 57% of Pakistani males aged 16-64 were in low-skilled employment, with the figure being 53% for their Bangladeshi counterparts.[16] The Department of Work and Pensions labour market status report up to the end of 2014 presented worrying figures for the 16-24 age demographic within these two particular ethnic communities. The unemployment rate for males aged 16-24 not in full-time education (FTE) within the British Pakistani/Bangladeshi merged dataset stood at an alarming 32.5%. This exceeded both the corresponding general ethnic-minority percentage of 27.1%, and the nationwide percentage of 16.6%.[17] The disproportionately disadvantageous position of young British Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim males within the labour market is certainly deserving of attention when considering potential ‘contributors’ to radicalization processes.
The segregationist consequences of the British state’s long-standing ‘multicultural’ approach to managing immigration-related diversity is no more evident than it is within education policy. Under both the New Labour government and David Cameron’s tenure as Prime Minister, Britain has witnessed the widespread proliferation of faith schools affiliated to a particular religious belief system. This ‘ethno-communitarian’ schools agenda was criticized by Professor Ted Cantle during New Labour’s period in government, with the leading authority on community cohesion describing faith schools as “automatic sources of division”.[18]
Similar concerns have been expressed by Matthew Taylor, chair of the Social Integration Commission – with Britain’s Muslim faith schools coming in for particular criticism. Due to their sheer lack of diversity, the rise in the number of Muslim faith schools was accused of breeding social and racial segregation across ‘Urban Britain’. Referring to the ‘free schools’ policy which allows religious organizations to help set up and establish faith-based educational institutions, the chair said that even though the Government had not deliberately promoted segregation, it had demonstrated a degree of carelessness by pursuing policies which were ‘anti-integration’.[19]
The Government in October 2014 shelved plans to introduce a ‘voluntary code of conduct’ for faith schools – despite it being recommended by a cross-government taskforce dedicated to tacking radicalization in religious supplementary schools. The following month, the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (OFSTED) identified a ‘radicalization risk’ at six Muslim private schools in East London. One of the secondary schools implicated, all-boys Jamiatul Ummah, was criticized in an OFSTED report for the ‘narrowness’ of its curriculum, with pupils’ “understanding of the fundamental values of British democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect of tolerance being underdeveloped”.[20] Meanwhile, the curriculum at the independent secondary all-boys Mazahirul Uloom School was criticized for being “focused solely on Islamic themes”.[21] Due to the overwhelmingly Islamo-centric nature of curricula across the schools, OFSTED chief inspector Sir Michael Wilshaw expressed concerns that pupils “were vulnerable to extremist influences and radicalization”.[22]
The British plural state’s ‘ethno-communitarian’ educational policy has been responsible for social segregation, the construction of co-religious social networks from an early age, limited inter-cultural interaction, the creation of school curricula which are inherently exclusivist due to their Islamo-centricity, and the subordination of British democratic values in schools that place considerable emphasis on Islamic and Arabic studies. Collectively, these conditions can position some young British Muslims in a most vulnerable state when exposed to extremist influences.
‘Organizational enablers and environmental dynamics’ (meso-level)
Meso-level analyses tend to focus on the role organizational forces can play in taking advantage of ‘environmental dynamics’ to facilitate radicalization processes. The focus here is on how broader environmental contexts act as a ‘rallying point’ and are ultimately utilized by non-state militant actors to press ahead with their extremist causes. The internet now represents a key ‘virtual ideological battleground’ where ‘meso-level’ extremist non-state actors promote their religious fundamentalist doctrine and seek to radicalize ‘at risk’ individuals online. The proliferation of online extremist material and dissemination of radical messages are now established techniques that lie at the centre of ‘radicalization strategies’ practiced by Islamist organizations.[23]
In the UK case, these cyber-radicalization tactics have been particularly exercised by ISIS and Al-Shabab to target young British Muslims. ISIS has published videos featuring British Muslim recruits who have issued a ‘call to arms’ and willed others in the UK to follow in their footsteps by pledging allegiance to the ‘jihadist’ cause and joining the Islamic State. Al-Shabab has released English-language videos featuring hip-hop music – specifically targeting British Somali youths living in urbanized areas suffering from dense economic deprivation.[24] The accessibility and freedom of the internet presents real opportunities for extremist organizations, enabling them to ‘work on’ vulnerable young British Muslims. Geographical distance is removed from the equation.
A key ‘environmental rallying point’ that acts as the ‘connective link’ between non-state Islamist organizations and their ‘radicalization targets’ is international geopolitics. Studies on British radicalization have found that events on foreign soil – the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the war on Afghanistan, the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, drone attacks in Northern Pakistan, instability within the territorially disputed area of Kashmir, the state execution of Islamist politicians in Bangladesh – can be identified as drivers of ‘political radicalization’ and facilitating recruitment processes for Islamist organizations.[25]
Some of these geopolitical issues are particularly problematic for Britain, due to the presence of young British Muslims of South Asian and Middle Eastern descent – meaning non-state militant organizations can often adopt and implement a targeted anti-Western ‘attack-on-your-motherland’ rhetoric when engaging with alienated radicalization targets within the UK.
How to progress?
It is vital that well-targeted and effective counter-radicalization strategies are implemented at all three levels of analysis. At the ‘micro-level’, there needs to be a clear ‘family-led’ counter-radicalization strategy. The British state cannot be overly blamed for its citizens leaving the UK for militant organizations such as the Islamic State – families, particularly parents, have a duty to exercise a more active role by meaningfully engaging with their children and monitoring problematic behavioural changes. Female empowerment within marginalized communities in this aspect is crucial – with ‘mother-son’ relationships being a particularly important familial dynamic within British Muslim communities. Government, charitable organizations, and outreach groups all have a role to play in helping to create a more ‘gender-inclusive’ grassroots approach to a counter-radicalization strategy.
Boosting employment outcomes must be a priority for individual-level counter-radicalization. While effective skills schemes and stronger connections with recruitment agencies are important, the prevailing assessment across various studies show that for ethnic minorities, educational gains are not necessarily converted into improved employment outcomes – despite often outperforming their white British peers academically. ‘Ethnic prejudices’ continue to persist in the UK labour market[26], which can act as a barrier to socio-economic integration and fuel feelings of social injustice. The government must rank the labour market ‘ethnic penalty’ issue highly on a broader anti-discrimination agenda, and perhaps seek to address this specific problem by introducing a ‘nameless’ job application system based on individual employment numbers.
At the meso-level, powerful ‘counter-narratives’ must be generated to confronting extremist propaganda disseminated on the internet. A reformist British liberal Islamic movement is needed to challenge religious fundamentalist doctrine by providing a modern ‘Europeanised’ re-interpretation of traditional understanding and practice. A transformative ‘British Islam’ which combines Islamic duties with post-Enlightenment values and traditions such as rule of law, democratic choice, human rights, gender equality and critical thinking. Organizations such as the Quilliam Foundation and British Muslims for Secular Democracy must continue in making a positive case to young British Muslims – one which challenges the puritanical zero-sum assertion that there is a direct choice to be made between being ‘British’ and ‘Muslim’. Due to growing ‘cyber-radicalization’, much of this ‘ideological battle’ will have to take place online through social media channels.
The government’s ‘Prevent’ strategy seems to underplay the role of foreign policy in radicalization processes. Any British government of the day must recognize the role international geopolitics and political grievances can play in ‘homegrown’ radicalization. The perception of the British political establishment as biased towards Israel and not demonstrating enough support for the ‘Palestinian statehood’ cause is entrenched across the British Muslim population. The Muslim Council of Britain, an umbrella body representing over 500 affiliated organizations, called for prospective parliamentary candidates to “support a binding recognition of Palestine as an independent and sovereign state” in the lead-up to the 2015 UK General Election.[27] In a country where there are 2.7 million Muslims while the enlarged Jewish population consists of only 370,000 people, the UK Government might well ask itself whether a recalibration of its established position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – particularly over official recognition of Palestinian statehood – is tactically needed in a domestic political sense.
The ultimate question that must to be asked is whether or not there needs to be a fundamental reformation of the British ‘plural state’. The overriding focus on celebrating ‘difference’ and ‘minority expression’ has contributed to the development of inward-looking ‘ethnic silos’ disconnected from wider social and economic structures. Ethno-communitarianism within schools policy has allowed for the creation of predominantly co-ethnic religious schools that impose narrow faith-based ideology onto young impressionable minds. If the British state wants its schools to be inclusive educational forums promoting inter-ethnic interaction, mutual respect, and critical thinking, then there are Muslim faith schools which operate in a way that is clearly antithetical to this aspiration.
Traditional multicultural orthodoxy needs to be replaced in regards to education – with recent regulatory systems proving to be grossly inadequate, the secularization of the entire school system, both state and private, looks an increasingly viable option. This would involve state schools, particularly those in urban districts, being returned under the regulatory control of local authorities. Alongside this restructuring of the state school sector, sources of funding for private sector schools ought to be more strictly monitored by state-run agencies.
Britain’s counter-radicalization responses will need to challenge prevailing orthodoxies across a range of policy matters. The segregationist ethno-communitarian order within schools policy needs to give away to a more secular inclusive framework. British Muslim mothers need to be emboldened, instead of self-appointed male community leaders who have often abused their power by pursuing divisive political agendas. More emphasis ought to be placed on constructing positive counter-narratives as opposed to relying on censorship and condemnation. Robust anti-discrimination employment measures need to be introduced, instead of merely placing faith in ‘self-correcting’ market mechanisms. Radical shifts in policy thinking are urgently required to effectively tackle domestic radicalization – the failure to do so will leave a nation irreversibly fractured, a society where narrow ideologies predominate, and a country ultimately defined by its internal disunity.
