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Scared Stupid?

Posted By November 3, 2014 No Comments

“Fear is the most significant common denominator for all soldiers.”

Author. Hero or Coward.  Elmar Dinter[1]

“Anyone who says he is not scared is either a liar or mentally deficient.”

Commander Bravo Two Zero. Special Air Service

Iraqi War, 1991. Andy McNab[2]

Nobody likes to admit when they are scared. This phenomenon is especially underscored for military members where professionalism, expectations, ego, and perceptions of what a true warrior embodies all act as barriers to acknowledging fear. While fear may not be all bad, it can goad people to make poor decisions that are based more on an imagined and fear-derived outcome than on a critical assessment of the evidence. Recognizing this connection will likely not diminish fear, but instead help mitigate some of the negative consequences of fear based decision-making.  This article explores some of these associations and illustrates—with examples from combat operations—how pervasive these connections can be. Notably, one does not have to be in battle for fear to manifest itself and thus the insights in this chapter can help everyone make better decision when scared and thereby avoid being scared stupid.

The true story of the nineteenth century sinking of the US whaleship Essex, as retold by Karen Thompson Walker, and is part of the inspiration for Herman Melville’s epic tale Moby Dick, is an excellent example of how fear can lead to poor decision making.[3] In 1819, the whaleship Essex found itself nearly 5,000 kilometers off the coast of Chile. There were twenty US sailors on board when the ship was struck by a sperm whale and sustained a massive leak. The twenty whalers huddled in three small whale-boats as the Essex flooded and sank. They were 16,000 kilometers from home and about 1,600 kilometers from the nearest landmass. They were floating in the middle of the Pacific with only rudimentary navigation equipment and limited food and water. There was no way to signal for help and there would be no search parties—they were left alone with their fears.

Twenty-four hours after the Essex had sunk the whalers came to the conclusion that they needed a plan. While they had options, none appeared to be good. They were just about as far from land as it was possible to be on earth. Their first option was to go to the nearest landmass, which were the Marquesas Islands, roughly 2,000 kilometers away—where the islands were rumoured to be inhabited by cannibals. Their second option was to sail to Hawaii. The danger with this option, however, was that given the season, they were likely to encounter potentially fatal storms along the way. Their third option was to go 2,500 kilometers south and hope the winds would be favourable to get them to South America. The danger with this longest option was that they had limited food and water.

The sailors needed to choose between cannibals, storms, or starvation.  Their imaginations went wild conjuring images of each of these scenarios. Not surprisingly, the most vivid image that they created was that of cannibals sinking their human teeth into human flesh, roasting live bodies, or boiling them in water to later be devoured in some sort of ritualistic feast where limbs would be pulled off corpses and gnawed on like chicken bones.

While sailing to Tahiti was the most logical choice, and likely presented the best chance of survival, the sailors rejected this choice out of fear of the imagined cannibals. The fear of being ripped apart by storms also proved too much to bear. The least gruesomely imagined and fear-evoking death was starvation. Despite the fact that this option represented the furthest distance to travel and the most likely outcome of running out of water and food, it was chosen because it quelled the sailor’s relative fears.

Two months into their journey, somewhat predictably, they ran out of food. By the time they were finally picked up by a passing boat, over half of the crew of the Essex were dead. Ironically, some of the survivors had resorted to their own form of cannibalism—the very scenario that they feared most. The ill-fated crew of the Essex had allowed their fears to guide their decision-making instead of applying the coolness of judgment, devoid of passion and imagination. Ultimately, fear governed the fate of the Essex crew and many of them paid for this with their lives.

Nearly two-hundred years later, fear continues to sometimes govern the decision-making of many bright individuals. After hearing the story of the Essex in a lecture, a special operations forces (SOF) operator reflected that a similar incident had occurred during the recent war in Afghanistan (c.2001-2014). He recounted how during one combat, close air support was called in to suppress heavy enemy fire. Shortly afterward, an Afghan man approached the convoy with what appeared to be a covered child cradled in his arms. He yelled at the foreigners and claimed that they had killed the infant.  He warned that if they continued along their current trajectory, they would come across enraged villagers, including women and children, who were prepared to retaliate and avenge the infant’s death.

The choice was clear: the convoy could either continue on their planned route or they could detour and go through an area that was a known ambush site. There was no third option. In discussing the alternatives, they graphically described the moral and ethical challenges that would face them if they continued on as planned. Morally, they feared having to fight civilians, particularly women and children. This fear was heightened when they imagined how their actions—even in self-defence—might be received back home. In fact, the imagined consequences were so awful that they quickly decided to go with a known high level threat—an ambush—rather than potentially face a mob of angry villagers.

Upon reflection, the operator acknowledged that their decision was based largely on imagined fear and that the Afghan had likely been lying not only about the impending attack by villagers, but also about the dead infant, whom no one had actually seen. Thankfully, the group fared far better than the crew of the Essex. Their decision processes bare remarkable resemblance, however.[4]

Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler—while acting as the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Niger—was kidnapped by Al Qaeda and held for five months with his colleague, Louis Guay. Both were also quick to identify the negative impact of fear on their decision-making processes.  As Fowler describes:

“Extreme fear and worry were the pervading themes of our Al Qaeda captivity: fear to the point of physical pain, fear that it would end suddenly with a sword, in a tent, on a video that would be seen by family and friends, and fear that it would go on and on and we would die of the heat, the food, the snakes, scorpions, or merely of broken wills and hearts.”[5]

Fowler acknowledged that, “Extreme worry and fear were enormously debilitating and physically taxing (memory loss, diminished appetite, insomnia).”[6] In particular, however, it was how fear affected their moods and their thought processes that were most troubling to the diplomat. At one point Fowler describes watching his captors dig a deep pit that he and Guay took no time in concluding were surely going to be their final resting spots. With few options, they worked themselves into a grim acceptance of their fate. As such, they were quite surprised when their captors placed long sticks over the hole and then stretched a poncho across it to create a shelter from the rain. Fowler notes of himself and Guay after this discovery that, “We were in shock. It took a while to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the whole near-death experience had been a fabrication of our own less that stable minds.” He continues, “While we believed our captors were entirely capable of killing us, and it was all too clear some of them wanted to get on with doing just that, what had happened the previous day was only indirectly related to them and far more something we had done to ourselves.”  As he lamented, “that took some getting used to.”[7]

While the negative effects of fear might be easy to identify post crisis, they are often ignored during the decision-making process. Importantly, recognizing the signs of fear can help you acknowledge your state of mind. Understanding that fear is not uncommon and appreciating how it might negatively impact your decision-making process can help you mitigate potential pitfalls.

Fear elicits both a physiological and psychological response. It is an emotion and has been described as, “a state characterized by physiological arousal, changes in facial expression, gestures, posture, and subjective feeling.”[8] Intense emotional experiences, such as fear, are usually accompanied by bodily changes. The sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system activates and prepares the body for emergency action—the fight or flight reflex. These bodily changes generally include: blood pressure and heart rate increase; increased rate of respiration; dilated pupils; increased perspiration while secretion of saliva and mucous decrease; increase in blood sugar levels, which provides a boost in energy; faster clotting of blood; the diversion of blood from the stomach and intestines to the brain and skeletal muscles; and the hair on the skin stands up often resulting in goose-bumps.[9]

All of these bodily changes optimize the flight or fight response. As such, fear should not be viewed entirely in a negative light. Social anthropologist John Dollard was quite astute when he noted of men in combat, “it is not fear that matters, but what a man does when he is afraid.”[10] Similarly, in Lone Survivor, Marcus Luttrell describes how fear can empower individuals.  While on a capture/kill mission in northern Afghanistan, Luttrell’s four-man SEAL team was compromised by two elderly Afghan shepherds and a teenager who they captured. They ultimately decided to abort the mission and let the shepherds go; somewhat predictably, the team  location was compromised and the SEAL team became enemy targets. Luttrell observed during the firefight that later ensued how, “it’s unbelievable what you can do when the threat to your own life is that bad.”[11] He also directly acknowledged the benefits that fear provides in heightening senses. While escaping his Taliban pursuers, he had to make a steep climb to escape.  He explains, “…before I made the first twenty feet…I slipped badly, which was a very scary experience. The gradient was almost sheer, straight down to the valley floor,” he continues, “In my condition I probably would not have survived the fall, and I somehow saved myself from falling any more than about ten feet…then I picked it up again. You’d have needed a chain saw to pry me off that cliff face.” Luttrell illustrates his motivation when he states, “All I knew was, if I fell, I would probably plummet several hundred feet to my death. Which was good for the concentration. [sic]”[12]

Nonetheless, while fear often leads to enhanced physical performance, it can also impact decision-making in a suboptimal way. In fact, research has shown, “that during stressful combat-like training, every aspect of cognitive function assessed was severely degraded, compared to the subjects’ own baseline, pre-stress performance.”[13] While simply recognizing this fact will likely not completely change the impact of fear or stress on decision-making, it can help to mitigate some of the negative effects. In fact, Robert Fowler and Louis Guay recognized this fact and used it to their advantage when held in captivity. As Fowler identifies, “The constant stress caused in each of us a startling and disturbing loss of short-term memory to a point at which I seriously wondered if I was losing my mind.” When Guay acknowledged the same symptoms, Fowler became less concerned. In fact, he notes, “In the dead recesses of what memory remained, I vaguely recalled reading something about this phenomenon in victims of post-traumatic stress disorder.” Having discovered the problem, they then sought—albeit halfheartedly—to find a solution.[14]

Indeed, one should always question what is driving decision-making; if it is fear, you should ask yourself if it is a legitimate fear and make sure that you are still making the best decision in the actual context that you are in. While there are many causes of fear, there are three principle reasons for fear that can negatively impact decision making, particularly in stressful situations. They are: fear of the unknown; fear of being judged; and fear of mission failure.

Fear of the unknown is arguably the most significant fear to be aware of because your imagination is free to run rampant, often unchecked by reality. Before even realizing that you are running from your imagination—and your imagination alone—it can be too late, as it was for many of the crew from the Essex. For example, Pete Blaber, a former Delta Force commander, describes running for his life from a bear during the final Delta Force selection process. In fact, when it came down to deciding whether to follow a trail or hurl himself off the edge of an unknown cliff, he wasted little time in deciding, noting “I’m going for the cliff. No bear is gonna catch me, I’m gonna jump.”[15] And jump he did, miraculously sustaining no injuries.

He was later horrified and ashamed to realize that he had not been running from a bear after all.  In reality, he had been chased by a pig. Blaber explains, “When I saw the little black creature through the corner of my eye, my tired and frustrated mind took a shortcut. I decided it must have been a baby bear with a mother not too far behind. When I heard the spastic scream of the animal in the bushes, I decided it had to be the vicious growl of a mother bear instead of what it actually was—the vicious oink of a mother pig.”  Blaber continues, “My contextless [sic] response was to run for my life and jump off a cliff.”  As he put it, “I got treed by a Chihuahua,” a phrase he uses to explain poor decisions that are made without accounting for the context.[16]

When you do not have all the information, your mind tries to fill the gaps. Fear is a very powerful replacement for proper context. As Andy McNab, the Commander of the eight man Special Air Service (SAS) team that infiltrated Iraq in January 1991, resulting in three members being killed, four being captured and one escaping, noted shortly after his capture, “I was scared: the fear of the unknown.” Additionally, on a previous encounter with the enemy he had noted, “the earlier you can see it the better, then that awful dread of the unknown evaporates.”[17] Indeed, making the unknown known is a great way to distil this type of fear.[18]

Fear of being judged is also an important fear to recognize because, like fear of the unknown, it pushes you to make decisions beyond their proper context. Fear of judgment gives heightened importance to how you perceive others will judge you, consequently impacting your decision-making and consequences. In Lone Survivor, Luttrell describes the decision process that ultimately led to the loss of his three SEAL teammates, as well as the helicopter full of SEALs that went to rescue them as, “the stupidest, most southern-fried, lame-brained decision I ever made in my life.” Not surprisingly, shortly after they had let the shepherds go, their position was compromised and the team was ruthlessly hunted by approximately 100 Taliban. Luttrell is clear when he describes the fears at play during their decision process:

“Was I afraid of these guys [shepherds]?  No. Was I afraid of their possible buddies in the Taliban? No. Was I afraid of the liberal media back in the USA? Yes. And I suddenly flashed on the prospect of many, many years in a US civilian jail alongside murderers and rapists.”

The fear of being judged and the associated consequences gave took priority during Luttrell’s decision-making process. This resulted in a decision that he later fully regretted and that many paid for with their lives. As Luttrell describes, “…I cursed those fucking goatherds to hell, and myself for not executing them when every military codebook ever written had taught me otherwise. Not to mention my own raging instincts, which had told me to go with Axe [teammate] and execute them.” He continues, “And let the liberals go to hell in a mule cart, and take with them all of their fucking know-nothing rules of etiquette in war and human rights and whatever other bullshit makes ‘em happy.” He asks, “You want to charge us with murder?” and then retorts, “Well, fucking do it. But at least we’ll be alive to answer it.”

Luttrell later provides a summation of his decision process: “Helpless, tortured, shot, blown-up, my best buddies all dead, and all because we were afraid of the liberals back home, afraid to do what was necessary to save our own lives. Afraid of American civilian lawyers.”[19] Considering multiple perspectives prior to making a decision is essential, but allowing the fear of being judged to overshadow your thought process can, as in the case described in the Lone Survivor, have dire consequences.

Fear of mission failure is also a crucial fear to recognize because it can create tunnel vision. SOF have been called a “no fail” force because SOF missions are structured so that failure is not an option. Furthermore, the strategic importance of success placed on SOF missions justifies the use of any means necessary to achieve success. The truth is, however, that while SOF tactical actions may have direct strategic and political consequences, many SOF missions, while important, do not directly change the course of a conflict or war. Moreover, in some cases, continuing on with a mission—despite a change of circumstance—might be even more detrimental than aborting the mission.

For example, on 30 July 1997, Hamas deployed two suicide bombers who detonated their bombs in the crowded Mahane-Yehude market in Jerusalem, killing sixteen and wounding 169 people. As a result, the Israeli government decided to assassinate a high ranking Hamas leader who was in Amman, Jordan. Complicating this was the fact that Israel had signed a peace agreement with Jordan three years prior and presently had good relations. Nonetheless, the government chose to pursue the assassination.

The mission was assigned to Mossad. Once the Mossad operators ascertained the target’s routine, a plan was derived. The plan called for one operator to open a can of soda pop near the target. The popping noise and spray of the shaken soda was intended to distract the target while a second agent applied a few drops of poison on the back of the target’s neck. The intent was that the target would get violently ill and pass away without any outward sign of violence or foul play.

While the plan appeared to be sound, the actual mission was a disaster. Although they were told to abort if there were any complications, the agents failed to do so. On the day of the mission the agents apparently failed to see—or acknowledge—the target’s young daughter run out of the car after her father, the driver get out of the car, or the Hamas militant delivering a document to the same building. In addition, the tab on the soda can tore off so there was no diversion. Nonetheless, the operators went forward with the mission. In the confusion, the target was sprayed with the poison. A scuffle broke-out and the police, attracted to the commotion on the street, arrested the agents who were using fake Canadian passports.  The event became a diplomatic nightmare.

The Israelis, in an attempt to repair relations, offered to provide the antidote to cure the target who quickly became deathly ill.  However, in order to do so, they were also forced to provide the chemical make-up of the poison and the antidote as the Jordanian physician would not otherwise administer the drug. Additionally, they were required to release twenty Jordanian prisoners held in Israel for the return of the two Mossad agents. Not surprisingly, political relations soured between Jordan and Israel.[20]

Poor decisions resulting from a singular focus on mission accomplishment, heightened by the fear of mission failure, can have even more dire consequences. In Pulitzer Prize winner Joby Warrick’s national best seller, The Triple Agent, the author describes the events that preceded the 30 December 2009 suicide bomb inside the CIA compound in Khost, Afghanistan. Interestingly, in retrospect, many of the key individuals had serious doubts about the Jordanian Al Qaeda propagandist who, once captured by the Jordanians, agreed to act as a “double” agent for the West. While many had their doubts if the rising superspy was trustworthy or was, in fact, acting as a “triple” agent committed to Al Qaeda while playing the West. Fear of losing the best opportunity to locate top Al Qaeda leaders mitigated this doubt and even allowed them to ignore standard operating procedures (SOPs) when the Jordanian entered the CIA base. Had they followed SOPs, then the bomb strapped to the Triple Agent’s chest would have been discovered before he had gained access to the inner echelons of the compound. Even immediately preceeding the detonation, doubts remained but fear restrained action. According to Warrick, one of the guards, a former Green Beret, “watched with growing alarm as Balawi [Triple Agent],”[21] having refused to exit on the guard’s side of the car as proper protocol dictated, “hobbled around the vehicle, one hand grasping the crutch and the other hidden ominously under his shawl.”[22]  Warrick continues explaining that the guard “tensed, finger on the trigger, eyes fixed on the shawl with instincts honed in dozens of firefights and close scrapes. One shot would drop the man. But if he was wrong—if there was no bomb—it would be the worst mistake of his life.”[23] In this case, the worse and last mistake of his life ended up being not taking that shot. Notably, this decision was simply the last event of many that was guided more by the fear of mission failure than by sound reason and logical thinking.[24]

Thankfully, common sense often prevails over mission accomplishment at a tactical level in the decision-making process. For instance, in Lone Survivor, Luttrell recounts how several days after his teammates were killed he came face-to-face with his team’s target. He describes, “I seem to recall that he had green eyes and that they were filled with hatred which would have melted a U.S. Army tank. He stared right through me and spoke not one word.” He continues, “I noticed he was unarmed, and I tightened my grip on the Mark 12 and very slowly turned it on him until the barrel was aimed right between his eyes. … After all, it was what I had come for; that or capture him, and that last part wasn’t going to happen at all.” Nonetheless, realizing that there was no danger to his life, and that shooting the target could cause harm to the villagers who had protected him and undoubtedly hinder the Coalition’s efforts in the counterinsurgency, Luttrell wisely lowered his weapon.[25] By not allowing the fear of mission failure to cloud his judgment, Luttrell likely contributed more to the Coalition’s campaign than his proceeding mission would have accomplished. While SOF should be considered a no-fail force in the sense that they are assigned high value tasks and targets, they should not be driven by the fear of mission failure, but rather by the importance of their roles within the wider political and military context.

In summation, fear is common and only a fool will never be afraid. Fear of the unknown, fear of being judged, and fear of mission failure are three of the most common fears that may cause SOF members to make poor decisions. As such, it is critically important to understand the impact fear may have on you or your team during operations. This knowledge can help enable you and your teammates to take the necessary actions to recognize and mitigate potential pitfalls created by fear and thereby avoid or compensate for them.

Specifically, what is required to mitigate the negative effects of fear are:

Learning to recognize the signs of fear so you can acknowledge whether or not you or your teammates are afraid and allow you to take the necessary actions to mitigate the potential negative side-effects;

Removing the negative stigma associated with fear. Everyone gets scared sometimes and fear is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, there are some positive physiological responses that come with heightened fear. Importantly, acknowledging fear can help you determine if you are making a decision based on fear or logic; and

Identifying the source of fear. If the source is a fear of the unknown, try to gain knowledge to make the unknown, known. Endeavour to acquaint individuals with all the possible pitfalls and threats they may encounter, even if only in briefing. Try to avoid individuals facing a threat for the first time on the actual operation so they are not totally surprised. In the end, always ensure that you are making decisions based on a real threat and not a threat that exists only in your imagination.

Fear is universal. Controlling your fears so that they empower you and do not impede your decision making is the ultimate goal.