Newsletter April 2008 #72

Table of Contents:

Alexander Mackenzie's Bookshelf

How Jihadis Fight

The ancient contest between the professional soldier and the amateur warrior is running stronger than ever, with the usual flavor being that of Western troops against Jihadist insurgents and terrorists in and around the Middle East. The results have been mixed, often because Western militaries remain fixated on conventional warfare (a traditional area of excellence) and so often neglect the hard-won lessons of historic encounters with Muslim combatants.

John H. Poole had spent 28 years in the United States Marine Corps, starting in 1965, and has spent his retirement years writing studies of the particulars of small unit combat. His recent study Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Posterity Press, North Carolina, 2004) reviews a history of Islamic guerrilla tactics with frequent references to the experiences of the last few years. Poole points out Islamic societies have traditionally been good at raiding/guerrilla style warfare; and usually are best at informal small unit tactics that swarm all around their opponents. Large-scale unit cohesion and individual discipline are not their strengths. In guerrilla warfare, Islamic insurgents make use of their whole community, particularly to provide constant surveillance of hostile soldiers; and they frequently rehearse extensively before delivering an attack. On the other hand, as guerrillas they tend to be sloppy about their security and defences. Poole points out that, with the aid of trainers from North Korea and Iran, a number of the deficiencies in their battle skills are improving. All in all, a useful if disturbing book.

War’s New Paradigm

Over 18 years ago, the Israeli strategist and military historian Martin van Crevald opined in The Transformation of War that ‘Trinitarian War’ -- wars waged by nation states against other nation states – was going to be become rare and that most wars would be waged by ‘Non-Trinitarian’ actors – a government, a people, or even a force (such as a guerrilla army fueled by narcotics) operating alone. Like most simple – but accurate – ideas, Crevald’s book was largely ignored. Now, General Rupert Smith of the British Army comments on recent history where van Crevald laid out a prediction.

The Utility of War (Random House, New York, 2007) is a more ambitious thesis on the migration from interstate industrial wars to what the author calls ‘war among the people’. Given the sort of conflicts being waged these days, this isn’t a bad descriptor. General Smith’s problem is that, being an officer in a force designed for interstate industrial conflict, that armed forces as an institution aren’t that well adapted for today’s types of conflict; but that the utility of military force is far from over. This is hardly an original conclusion nowadays, but Rupert does guide his reader through to his conclusions like a hybrid academic and general staff officer would; irrefutably with every argument nailed down.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca