Mackenzie Briefing Notes -- Issue #23

Violent Implications of Scarcity: What to Expect in the Food and Fuel Crises

Foreword

Trouble always slides in on a logarithmic curve – first gently sloping and seemingly nothing to be concerned about; then gradually steepening, but something that one believes they can cope with. Finally, one is left clinging to the cliff face with the abyss far below, and no hand-holds in sight.

It is equally true that hardly any crises have single causes. Between the food crisis and the risk of even more dramatically increased fuel prices, we are sliding into trouble… and there are other factors that may worsen it.

It might take an economist to notice or map out a situation like the current shortage of grain that has suddenly confronted the world, but he or she might not be quite ready to understand how this will translate into civil unrest and violence. History might be a more reliable guide to that.

We are a long way from tumbling into the abyss that scarcity represents; but human beings being what they are, folly could well lead us further downwards. Tough, practical and determined leadership will be necessary – assuming there are leaders like that left in public life anywhere. Crisis also brings about change, and not all of it need be negative. There are opportunities that may present themselves, if we dare.

The Sun Says 'No' to Global Warming

As always, in considering food shortages, look at the weather first. Humanity is plagued by short memories and a habit of dancing along the edge of catastrophe curves. In recent years, bombarded with warnings of global warming from the environmental movement, we have overlooked the point raised by archeologists, historians, geologists and paleontologists that climate change is always occurring. The climate we think of as 'normal' because it is what we were accustomed to when younger, never comes with a guarantee of immutability. Indeed, the history of humanity is a chronicle of coping with climate change. However, we never cope with it painlessly.

While this writer might be the first to agree with David Suzuki or Al Gore that pollution is bad, it was impossible to accept the proposition that global warming could be as catastrophic as they depicted. Historically, cooler temperatures are worse for humanity, and periods of glaciation have always been a severe trial for our ancestors (human and hominid alike). On balance we have normally prospered in warmer times. Moreover, the warnings about mass extinctions from climate change were foolish indeed – every animal and plant species that exists today is a survivor of at least 600,000 years of frequent rapid fluctuations in climate across the whole planet. Many of the animals and plants we know are as opportunistic as humans when it comes to adapting to change. It is human activities such as deforestation and urban sprawl rather than climate change which present far more severe threats to eco-diversity and our natural heritage.

The data on global warming has been spotty indeed and often weak, with the result that it was buttressed by the creation of a manufactured conformity… so much so, that contrary evidence was often ignored or willfully suppressed. This is why troubling news from some of the world's observatories was ignored last year, and why the implications are still overlooked by most of us. But last year, old Sol, our life-giving star reminded us about the main influence on global temperatures when sunspot activity dwindled alarmingly. We know from historical records that low sunspot activity is invariably co-related to cooler temperatures.

Climate change has arrived all right – and the main sources of data reported a rapid global cooling in 2007. Mean temperatures across the planet declined by 0.7 degrees Celsius last year – one of the most remarkable temperature changes ever recorded. The last year when things were this cool was 1930, and this is despite the troubling growth of atmospheric carbon dioxide from human sources. The key engine in this rapid change was a virtual absence of sunspots on the face of Sol last year. The near-absence has continued since.

There is an 11 year sunspot cycle, and late 2007 was supposed to be the low-part of the cycle, which would normally mean a slightly cooler year would have occurred anyway. However, the new cycle has begun, but with much less intensity than hundreds of years of solar observations would lead us to expect. Right now, we cannot tell if this is a very short term aberration which might end tomorrow, a cooler 11 year cycle, the start of a Maunder Minimum (a period of several decades of cooler temperatures such as occurred between 1645 and 1715) or –at an absolute worst – the trigger for the next ice age. But so far, (as of May 11th, 2008), sunspot activity has been trivial and this is not good news. What we do know is this: No sunspots equate to cooler and drier temperatures; and that equates to poor harvests in most of the world's main grain-growing areas.

Bad Weather and Bad Harvests

In the winter of 2007-08, there was snow in Baghdad (where snow hasn't been seen for centuries) and it snowed twice in Tel Aviv. One popular indicator for global warming proponents has been the coverage of sea ice in Polar Regions – but sea ice coverage in the Arctic last winter was as extensive as it used to be decades ago, and coverage in the Antarctic promises to be a historic high. Much of China was lashed by unusually heavy blizzards and Toronto enjoyed a near-record snowfall (without a panicked mayor calling out the army!). The vagaries of climate change being what they are; Scandinavians thought they had a mild winter indeed.

However, local experiences do not constitute real evidence of lasting climate change, or by themselves often present much of a crisis. What is more important has been the performance of the World's cereal crops.

It is hard to model the effects of climate change, although it easy enough to deduce what the effects have been historically. One thing is certain for the tropics -- particularly for much of Asia, Australia and southern and eastern Africa: Cooler temperatures reduce the effects of the monsoon season and so degrade grain production.

India and China produce over half of the world's rice; they also consume just about everything they grow. Asian farmers grew something like 91% of the world's total estimated production of rice in 2006. While production figures for 2007 are not yet available, one thing is clear – the price of rice has risen some 80% since January 2007 and stockpiles around the world are critically short.

The top receivers of rice in the world (according to the most recent statistics from the UN World Food Program) are Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Ivory Coast, India (despite being a net exporter), Madagascar and Ecuador. Indonesia also imports more rice than it grows. China has frozen all exports of rice as of April 11th, 2008, while India is threatening to follow suit.

To compound problems, Vietnam – one of the world's leading rice exporters – had major problems with its crop last year due to diseases and pests (which may be associated with suboptimal growing conditions); and has also decided to cease exports this year.

Bad weather also affected wheat production in Canada in the summer of 2007 as a 20% drop in expected yields was experienced, and European production also was reduced by bad weather – especially in the usually fertile Ukrainian breadbasket. Poor weather in China also caused a 10% drop in expected production while Australia has been plagued by a long drought. Argentina (another major wheat exporter) curtailed shipments in late 2007, pending the completion of their harvest in 2008; and Ukraine may do the same this year.

To compound matters, there are several other factors to consider. First, even before the bad weather of 2007 was fully apparent, the world's population was nibbling into our collective stockpiles of wheat, rice and corn for some years. Since 1998, annual consumption had outstripped annual production throughout the world for six years out of eight. Contributions to this over-consumption result from the growing prosperity of India and China, where demand has dramatically increased thanks to an appetite for meat (and hence for feedstock for animals). Other factors include the diversion of production to bio-fuel projects in a number of grain producing nations; and – to a lesser extent – measures in the European Union to reduce historic overproduction of grain.

Of course, another part of the problem is that humanity's numbers are still growing – there are 6.67 billion of us (according to US estimates) as of the end of April 2008. While population growth rates have been gradually slowing since the 1960s, most reasonable estimates project a total population of 9 billion people by 2050. Given the situation upon us now, one might wonder if we indeed can feed these numbers if we continue to add something like 70 to 75 million people a year; with the most intense growth in areas of the world (the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa) that are not currently capable of feeding themselves.

The shortage of grain has led to major problems for the world's livestock and poultry producers – the costs of feeding cattle, pigs, sheep and chickens has risen enormously in recent years. This has placed many producers under severe strain even though the growing demand for meat in China and India has opened up new markets for farmers.

The demand for bio-fuels is already being blamed in some media sources as the main cause of higher food prices; with predictable emphasis on American programs. American bio-fuel programs were already presenting hardship for North American livestock producers before 2007, particularly when some estimates placed bio-fuel diversion at 20% of American corn production. Moreover, many American grain farmers have switched to growing corn because of the inducements for being involved in bio-fuel. The appetite for alternatives to oil was also diverting corn, sugar cane, soybeans and palm oil to fuel production in Brazil, China, Western Europe, Thailand, India, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia before 2007.

There are other problems to consider. The carrying capacity of China may be reduced by acute pollution; India's agricultural expansion could be readily curtailed by water-shortages; and urban sprawl onto prime agricultural land is not just a North American phenomenon by any means.

The demands for bio-fuels and weather problems in 2007 have led to a related cause of stress. There is a growing shortage of cooking oil. Prices for soybean, palm and vegetable oils have climbed 37% through 2007 and are soaring higher. For most Asian cultures, cooking oil is second only to rice in its importance; but its use is common enough elsewhere too and this is going to drive up the prices of many commercial food products throughout the world.

As is usual at the edge of catastrophe, it was clear that this situation had been developing for years; but the warnings from sundry economists, bureaucrats and industry analysts had largely gone unheeded.

Even if a prolonged period of colder climates and continued absence of sunspots does not manifest; the weaknesses in global food production have been exposed. We have now chewed through our reserves and there is no longer enough margin for error. The shortages will continue for years to come, even if efficient action is taken immediately, not least because of continued population growth.

Considerations on Food Shortages

Throughout most of the history of humanity from the dawn of the Neolithic to the Industrial Revolution, the natural state for most human beings who ever lived was to exist as subsistence farmers ruled over by a variety of squabbling aristocrats (and those who denigrate Western civilization should remember who changed this circumstance). Most of humanity was familiar with hunger, but it took a rare combination of circumstances to create a true famine.

In the last few years, the new multi-disciplinary approach to medieval history has revealed that the average peasant generally lived quite well, for about seven years out of every ten; providing he could stay and work his land. However, every now and again nature threw in a crop failure or two, and a hungry year resulted – particularly if the grain supply fell off. What has been apparent from the deposited evidence in old medieval latrines is that people could cope, although such a year would be hard on the elderly and the very young. However, while nature could cause food shortages, it took a series of disasters (often caused by sudden climate fluctuations) to induce such episodes as the Great Famine in Europe of 1315-18; or it took the hand of man. Famine could come even in a good year if an army marched through your village.

Since the arrival of the Industrial Revolution, with the benefit of railroads and cheap reliable shipping, nature-induced famine has become virtually unknown in developed areas. Man-made famine is something else again. There are four causatives for famine in a modern society.

Over-reliance on a main crop (the Irish Potato Famine);

Deliberate induction of famine through state coercion (The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-33, or the mass starvation in the Netherlands and Greece under Nazi occupation);

Government incompetence (the Bengal Famine of 1943, or contemporary Zimbabwe);

Mass anarchy and a complete breakdown of society (Somalia 1992).

In most cases, such as the Irish Potato Famine or the drought in Somalia, nature might provide the initial cause of food shortage; but human action (or inaction, in Ireland's case) compounded the shortage and induced famine. In the Irish example of 1845-52, the island was extremely overcrowded (British census figures estimate that 8.1 million people lived there in 1841) and the teeming numbers of rural poor had come to over-rely on the potato as the main item of diet. While the near total failure of the crop was disaster enough, Ireland continued to export grain and other foodstuffs to England for several years, and British officials were extremely slow in providing aid. In the most stricken parts of Western Ireland, the lesson was learned that famine is worst among refugee populations outside of the reach of efficient logistic systems. Various tragedies in Africa frequently prove this point even today. In the coming months, this will become abundantly clear again.

What normally prevents a food shortage from becoming a famine is the normal resilience and flexibility of human beings. From Neolithic subsistence farmers to the modern consumer, we all have choices and alternatives to our usual habits and lifestyles. If a crisis is not too severe or prolonged, we can adapt and all of us have ancestors who certainly did. The market plays its historic role too, by providing us with new products and solutions, allowing alternatives to some products to appear, and encouraging innovation.

However, there may have to be some limits on speculation and hoarding too – this point is illustrated by the failure of the civil government in Bengal after a crop failure and the loss of Burmese rice supplies to Japan in 1942. Speculation and hoarding drove the price of rice far out of reach of the poor, and a million starved to death in consequence.

For most of us, a food shortage does not automatically translate into mass famine… unless we really screw up. Any proposals for some bureaucratic international agency (particularly under the UN's aegis) are among the things that could well bring about such a disaster. The next few years will also tellingly illustrate the differences between competent and incompetent governments.

Price controls and rationing would probably be unnecessary in Canada, but active subsidies to encourage production could be (regardless of existing trade agreements) useful. Individual consumers might eat at home more often and make more efficient choices (such as having oatmeal for breakfast more often and eating bacon and eggs less). Homeowners might find that a vegetable garden is a useful supplement again. We might find that a generous immigration policy is no longer in our best interests and – with drier conditions prevailing in the prime agricultural lands of the American west – we might indeed have to divert water to the United States.

We should also remember that in history, food shortages often present a severe challenge to law and order.

Opportunistic Demagogues

Every human being should know how fear stimulates aggression and resentment is stoked by deprivation. These reactions are probably hard-wired; our primate cousins usually show these responses. We've probably all behaved this way at times as children, and – hopefully – learned how to master or suppress these reactions as adults.

In human society, the manifestation of mass resentment and aggression is common enough; particularly when food shortages beckon. Under these circumstances, mobilization to act usually occurs along expected lines: By clan or tribe, religion, ethnic or socio-cultural grouping or any other means of identification against an authority that can somehow be explained as having been alien to the group or having alienated itself.

In discussing the origins of the French Revolution, traditional historians tend to downplay one of the significant contributing factors to the eruption in violence in 1789 – a poor harvest had led to a radical increase in urban food prices. The Paris mob got nervous and turned on the authorities of their day. Food continued to be short in France until the mid-1790s, at which time the crisis (and the worst of the revolutionary violence) abated.

The 1848 'Year of Revolutions' in Europe began with demonstrations in London and spread throughout most of the continent, even resulting in a violent revolt in Austro-Hungary. It was no coincidence that the Potato-Blight had also spread to Europe by 1847 where the potato had already become an important part of everyone's diet. Bad weather had also caused significant shortages in rye and wheat in 1846 and 1847. Again, while nationalism and liberalism get the ideological credit for the disruptions, the trigger was nervousness about food.

In the Second World War, the Nazi government had placed a significant emphasis on German self-reliance on food; and the Germans continued to be well-fed right up until 1944. One of the main reasons behind this was the memory of the German collapse in 1918, following years of tight rationing with the imposition of the Allied blockade of Germany at the start of the First World War. When the German collapse in 1918 came, it came swiftly indeed as malnourished Germans abandoned the war effort they had sustained for four years. One could also remember the rallying cry of the Bolsheviks in Russia “Peace! Land! Bread!” The war's demand on manpower and railway capacity had led to tightened belts in Russia's cities, and ordinary Russians decided this plus the diet of battlefield defeats had been enough.

The American science fiction writer Jerry Pournelle famously observed in his novel Lucifer's Hammer (co-written with Larry Niven) that 'civilization is only 24 hours and two missed meals deep.' While famine victims are seldom restless – being too preoccupied with the necessity of survival – the threat of hunger, rather than hunger itself, makes people very uneasy.

A well-organized coercive regime that has demonstrated its willingness to murder, or one that is under external attack from a ruthless enemy, can risk episodes of widespread food shortages. The Soviet Union easily withstood internal famine and the lean rations its citizens endured in the Second World War. An authoritarian state can also cope if the public has a victim to blame (which is why violent revolutionary regimes often need class enemies). Any other government is going to face varying degrees of unrest.

In the last few months, food riots have been reported in Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, The Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe (where endemic food shortages have been reported for years thanks to the criminal incompetence of the Mugabe government). Many of these riots have been deadly, and they will probably get worse in the coming months. It is reasonable to assume that major riots can well lead to coups, insurrections, and a dramatic upsurge in terrorism. The impetus for mass migration and flight from these countries will be greatly strengthened as well.

As always, the possibility of hundreds of thousands (or millions) of deaths await particular circumstances. In times of hunger, the most vulnerable are those who are displaced. A mass movement of people who think they might be better fed elsewhere can be a very deadly event, as the elderly, the young and the ill fall out of the refugee columns having expended their reserves of energy before food-aid is reached.

Mass hunger also inevitably brings in the risk of epidemic for displaced people. Cholera and dysentery were real killers in the Irish Potato Famine and for the displaced Hutus of Rwanda after their campaign of genocide failed. Historically, lean years have sometimes been followed by epidemics – as happened in Byzantium in the 540s; while the Plague outbreak in Europe in the 1340s followed a period of frequent poor weather. When a population has been both undernourished and nervous, immune systems become weaker, and there is always some virus ready to take advantage.

Under these circumstances of a general food shortage, a civil conflict can also be very deadly-- particularly if violent ideologues are involved. Each individual's concerns about food make it easy to resent those he imagines are better off, and there may be the corresponding notion that getting rid of his foes means better food security for himself. It is easy to suppose that this might be another causative factor in the spectacular murderousness of the Paris and Lyon mobs in Revolutionary France, or in Revolutionary Russia. Imagine what might result if, for instance, the government of Egypt was toppled by the Islamic Brotherhood. There would be mass executions, massacres, and labor camps; the dead would be in the hundreds of thousands with little effort. As we have also seen in the concentration camps of the 20th Century, starvation is the most efficient tool for mass murder a totalitarian can employ.

In Liberal democratic societies, most people don't have strong clan or cultural identities, so to mobilize their fear and unease, they'll have to turn elsewhere. Unfortunately, there are demagogues in any human society. Like the viruses that lurk in the human body, waiting for a moment of weakness to exploit their opportunities; the wanabe revolutionaries of Anarchist, Marxist, Neo-Nazi and Nihilist varieties are always waiting for their chance. So too are the would-be leaders that usually just peddle resentment to ethnic groups in the hope of gaining power and influence. Under most conditions, a healthy society can ignore such troublemakers; although it is usually best to maintain a watchful eye just in case.

Under current circumstances, with rising food prices presenting a particular challenge to people on low or fixed incomes, a society's immune systems become weakened. This gives the demagogues a chance; and very few of them are likely to ignore it. Theories of blame and constructs of envy will make it easy to generate anger towards “the rich”, “those fat cats”, “greedy corporations”, or some minority of choice. By now, most of us should know how this works, and should understand that nervous people are more likely to buy a demagogue's message.

In Canada, for instance, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) has a long history of provocative behaviors and a penchant for starting riots. Usually, their core group of unruly protest junkies in the Toronto area only numbers less than a couple of hundred people; but its leaders are unlikely to restrain themselves if they see that a rally targeted against “Corporate Food Profiteers” (or whatever) brings out a couple of thousand people. On the other side of the equation, one might well expect the Patriot Militias in the US to grow in numbers again; feeding off lower-middle class anxiety, conspiracy theories, and a vague sense – or hope for some of them – that apocalyptic times are upon us. There will also be unease among new-comers from unstable and severely affected nations, and some of them might be easily induced to riot given their natural fears about friends and family back in their homelands.

We have not faced truly dangerous demagogues in some time and forget how dangerous they can be. Giving them any influence or respect is always a mistake, because they'll come back for more as soon as they can. In the times that are coming, it would be wise to watch the would-be revolutionaries of the Far Left and Extreme Right very carefully.

Oil: The Compounding Factor

Disaster hardly ever has a single cause; usually it is a combination of events, each of which might have been easily surmountable by itself, that ushers in catastrophe. Economists and industry analysts have often discussed the causes of rising oil prices in recent years -- so the subject hardly needs elaboration here. Suffice it to say that demand for oil has grown greatly in recent years as China and India have grown in prosperity while unrest in the Middle East has led to speculation (which producing countries and corporations both enjoy); as major increases in price lead to improved profits for all. However, the combination of higher oil prices in tandem with food shortages will greatly amplify the effects of each other.

After all, the production of food, especially in developed countries, consumes a lot of energy. Running farm equipment; deliveries of fertilizers, feed, and pesticides; the shipment of food to processing sites and then to market; it all takes fuel. Profit margins in the agricultural sector aren't that great, especially for farmers themselves. Rising fuel prices have already represented a significant hardship to many producers and if this gets worse, few of them can afford to stay in business without significantly increasing their prices. While special fuel programs or subsidies normally don't seem like a good idea, it might be prudent to consider them now.

Economists can map out what the combination of higher food prices and higher fuel prices can do in a general sense – inflationary times are themselves destabilizing enough, even with cheap food and fuel. However, the effects around the world will be profound as we struggle to increase food production and cope with the effects of the shortage: Shipping and transportation costs will rise, putting an even greater strain on the budgets of aid groups; while the deployment of military assets (for humanitarian work or to counter new threats) will also be much more expensive.

The impact of higher fuel prices on our economies will be grim; particularly as the Middle Class (already nervous in the US about the credit crunch and the fall-out from the subprime mortgage debacle) feels the full effect of filling up their gas tanks before going grocery shopping. In addition to the usual effects of this that economists might imagine, remember that an uneasy Middle Class is also prone to listen to extreme ideas and get resentful when subjected to hardship. The hungry lower classes might have made the revolutions of 1789, 1848, and 1917-18 possible, but it took an upset Middle Class to lead them. The Middle Class has managerial and organizational skills; can generate and spread ideological ideas, and can finance the basic organizations needed to bring a sharp focus to widespread unrest.

By and large, when the Middle Class gets frustrated and potentially violent, they can go in two different directions. Some will get regressive and defensive; particularly the less prosperous members of the Middle Class. Vigilantism can be expected, or a support for any radical element that promises 'stability' – which was one of the main reasons why Hitler came to power. This is why, for instance, in the US, the Patriot Militias might make a major come-back.

Others will take on the status quo in their societies and challenge it; normally this is seen as being “progressive” in the classic Marxist model, but what could one make of contemporary society where the so-called progressives are in so many positions of authority? This is going to be a troublesome year for 'politically correct' politicians and bureaucrats – which might well be a positive outcome. There are growing signs of a mounting intolerance in the UK and much of Europe towards those who facilitate and excuse Islamic radicals inside their nations; as might be expected from recent election results in Italy, France, and the UK.

What might be of more concern is what happens to a nervous and upset Middle Class in other nations. The Middle Class in Egypt is growing intolerant of government corruption and the high-handed manner of many of the security forces; and the Islamic Brotherhood did originate with the Middle Class there. Egypt is one among many countries with a growing risk of a revolution. The same is also true of Saudi Arabia, while the Middle Classes in Lebanon have been growing more upset with Hizbollah and the Syrians. It is also possible that Iran could see a major upsurge in domestic unrest this year… and that might help to finally trigger an even more violent outcome.

Iran: The Wildest Card of All

Even without the implications of rapid global cooling and food shortages, Iran has been presenting a serious threat to global stability in recent months. A full exposition of the Iranian situation would deserve a lengthy paper of its own, but in summary, the main factors are these:

Iran is a revolutionary state, and like most revolutions seeks to export its ideology – a Shi'ite variety of the Salafistic Islamic revival. Towards this end, it has spent 25 years sponsoring terrorist groups (Hizbollah particularly) and encouraging violence elsewhere;

As the revolutionary cadre ages, they have grown corrupt and inefficient at home (as such men are wont to do) but grow more impatient about seeing their visions implemented elsewhere;

Iran also has a traditional interest in being the major power in its immediate neighbourhood, and seeks to gain influence and power to further this agenda;

Iran is a Shi'ite dominated state and seeks to further the interests of Shi'ites elsewhere in the Middle East;

The revolution is growing unpopular at home particularly due to poor economic performance, but Iran's rulers hope that external opposition and opportunities can garner internal support for the regime (as it did in the 1980s in its long war with Iraq);

It is often the case that the most extreme factions in a Revolutionary movement eventually take power; in Iran's case this faction (under President Ahmadinejad) has a millennialist penchant and believes they have a duty to prepare the way for the arrival of the Mahdi. Whether this is a true belief or just posturing, it is particularly unsettling considering that…

Iran is rapidly building ballistic missiles and has a nuclear weapons program whose progress is swiftly advancing. Some intelligence sources believe they may have a bomb ready by 2009 (particularly since Ahmadinejad in March 2008 announced that Iran had 6,000 gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, twice the estimated number);

Iran is the sponsor of Hizbollah, which has been involved in frequent clashes with the Israelis and precipitated one war in 2006. Hizbollah is fully re-armed and has large stocks of rockets with which to bombard much of Israel;

Moreover, Iran has been arming and supporting Hamas, which has done the impossible and made old Yasser Arafat's Fatah look like moderates. Hamas controls the Gaza strip and has been frantically arming ever since they won control of that territory from Fatah in the summer of 2007;

Iran's proxies frequently engage Israel, particularly with rocket bombardments, and Iran has made such threatening remarks to Israel apropos of its developing nuclear programs that even Arab newspapers in Egypt and Jordan (both of whom would get much of the fallout from a nuclear attack) have pointedly reminded Israel of its right to self-defence;

Iran (and North Korea) have been supporting the development of nerve gas and – seemingly – radiological weapons in Syria for potential use against Israel;

Iran has also been arming, training, and financing the Mahdist rebels in Iraq and has been also contributing to the Taliban in Afghanistan; and has become particularly blatant about this support over the past two years. Some intelligence analysts also conclude that Iran may be sheltering Osama bin Laden himself.

It should come as no great surprise to anyone that a major war is brewing in the Middle East, and that it would be best for such a war to break out before Iran becomes a nuclear armed state. However, given the arms and location of Iran's proxies in Lebanon and Gaza; and in Iraq and Afghanistan, nobody should expect it to be over quickly and painlessly, even given American involvement with precision airpower (the Americans cannot hope to stay out of this conflict, nor should they even try).

Of necessity, this war would need to see Hizbollah and Hamas reduced, and this will not be accomplished without substantial loss of life, particularly as both groups tend to rely on Israel's traditional restraint towards causing civilian casualties and take as much advantage of it as they can. In a war for naked survival, Israel would do well to abandon this traditional practice… there can be circumstances where ruthlessness is merciful in the long run.

The food crisis makes this war more likely, particularly as the Iranian government and Hamas will be vulnerable to domestic protests. Iran's rulers have already amply demonstrated their intentions to refocus internal dissent against an external enemy. Hamas might well be keenly aware of what would befall them, should they be toppled in Gaza by other Palestinians.

What may happen in this war is that the cost of oil will climb alarmingly and that may well be a part of an Iranian strategy to damage America's economy. Twenty years ago, Iran sought leverage in its war with Iraq by attacking oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. They now have even better weapons (thanks to Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles) to menace tanker traffic in the Straits of Hormuz. Also, production facilities in virtually all of the Persian Gulf lie within range of Iranian Scud missiles. Iran may also seek to mine the straits and could use its agents to blow up oil pipelines around the world. Imagine what will happen to fuel prices under these circumstances.

Peering at the Crystal Ball

Predicting the future is always risky, which is why it is usually wise to refrain from doing so. After all, the sun might suddenly be speckled with sunspots the very minute this report is dispatched to the printers -- letting the prognosticators of global warming return to work without potential embarrassment.

Yet the food crisis is here to stay, and higher food prices will be the rule for some time to come. Apocalyptic mass famine is most unlikely, although the food aid for refugees in the future will be much sparser than it has been and famine could indeed beckon to them. For the rest of us, belt-tightening is more likely to be a financial metaphor than an actual physical circumstance of our lives. Even so, a rise in political extremism is a safe prediction, though how and where it might manifest could be a matter of informed guesswork.

The news will be crowded with stories of hardship, protest, and financial failure. The news from abroad will probably carry stories of the most vicious war the Middle East has yet seen, particularly since civilian casualties will be unavoidable, given that the likeliest combatants on one side invariably shelter behind their own families. There will be coups, major riots and an upsurge in terrorism, but there might also be unfriendly governments toppled and tyrants driven into exile.

The crises will last for several years; perhaps decades if the sun's current behavior is the start of another Maunder Minimum. Even if normal sunspot activity returns today, it will take a year or two for temperatures to return to what we currently think of as 'normal', and the food and fuel crises will still be with us anyway. If the absolute worst result prevails – as unlikely as it is -- and the sun's behavior is the trigger for the next expansion of the glaciers, then we will have even worse things to deal with.

Even without the complexities offered by the sun, and supposing that somehow a major Middle Eastern War is averted, the intertwined food and fuel crises still offer a severe challenge to our societies. Pragmatism, not ideology, must be the order of the day and the penalties for failure at the steep edge of a precipice will be severe.

World Cereal Production

(2003/04 US Department of Agriculture Figures)

Top Ten Wheat Producers

Top Ten Rice Producers

Top Ten Corn/Maize Producers

The Mackenzie Institute

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John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca