Long Haul in the War on Terror

by John Thompson

November 25, 2002

There was a little good news in the war on Terror as the end of November 2002 drew near. Two important members of the Al-Qaeda network were captured and another cell (this time in the UK) had been scooped up before they could inflict deadly harm on innocent civilians.

For Canadians, there was no news to smile about — but it seemed as if Ottawa might finally get around to banning the front organizations for Hezbollah and Hamas (although it wouldn’t do to hold one’s breath waiting for this to finally occur); and we might be able to scrape together a thinly manned infantry battalion to eke out the effort against Iraq. On the other hand, we had one of our Prime Minister’s aides openly describe President Bush as a ‘moron’ — clearly indicating her own inability to accurately spot them. She might look in the mirror or at her boss for improvement in this regard.

One thing that is truly moronic about Ottawa (and other national capitals in this era) is a reluctance to brace up to confront the war against Al Qaeda and its hosts and sponsors; including the failure to recognize the point that this is going to be a war, and one that may last for decades.

Al Qaeda is like no other terrorist group that the world has ever seen. Moreover, it is not actually a terrorist group at all, but rather the militant arm of an aggressive ideology.

The foremost scholars on Islam and those who have studied Osama Bin Laden most closely agree on a number of key points: The Islamic world is in crisis, as a result of its inability to cope with the modern world and its innate conservatism. Rather than reform of their own religion and its institutions, a sizeable number of Muslims prefer to blame the outside world for their internal problems and are disposed towards the answers of the demagogues of the Fundamentalist ideology.

The Fundamentalists themselves are first cousins to the Nazis and Marxists of yesteryear and are just as dangerous as these were. Indeed, the likes of Osama Bin Laden and his supporters have borrowed heavily from the thinking and habits of the Western 20^th Century Totalitarians, albeit with Islamic trappings superficially affixed to ideological constructs that Hitler’s cronies would have recognized.

Hitler and Stalin were ruthless, but they were not stupid. Both knew how to generate excitement, raise fanatical followers, and attract widespread support. The Fundamentalists know this too; and some observers of Middle Easter politics believe they have a following of about 15% of the Islamic World, and have the general sympathy of about 50% of the world’s 1.2 Billion Muslims. These are numbers that can translate into formidable levels of financial and political power, and which are already making the governments of Muslim nations tread very carefully indeed.

Worse still, any number of officials in Muslim countries (or even in Western countries) can support the Fundamentalists even if their own governments won’t. A supportive military quartermaster can leave a backdoor open to a warehouse containing shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles; a bank branch might open itself to transfer money to Al-Qaeda supporters and the official who might otherwise regulate their activities can turn a blind eye for ideological reasons.

Al Qaeda is also much more than an ordinary terrorist group. For a start, it is a meta-network; in essence a network of networks. Its component networks, their cells and thousands of individuals are capable of autonomous action; and will survive the break up of Al-Qaeda itself. Moreover, the Islamic Fundamentalists have a proven ability to recruit new members. Casualties will be replaced.

Fighting a terrorist group is always a battle of attrition, and a slow one at that. Instead of the rapid decision that attends conventional warfare, victory is measured in the ability to deprive a terrorist group of trained members and experienced leaders faster than the terrorists can replace them. For example, in the early 1980s, the IRA had some of the most skilled bomb-makers in the world, and the acme of their skill could be seen in the 1984 Brighton Hotel bombing that nearly got Margaret Thatcher. Ten years later, the IRA’s bombing campaign in London largely consisted of amateurish pipe bombs (such as any half-wit Anarchist can assemble with instructions off the Internet).

Considerably more resources are being directed against Al Qaeda than ever were at the IRA, but with hundreds of thousands of potential terrorists backed by tens of millions of active supporters, Al-Qaeda is an altogether tougher proposition. Every effort will have to be made by every Western nation to reign in the threat they present; and there can be no toleration at all for half-measures in shutting down their financial and political support structures.

The risk of general warfare in tackling Islamic Fundamentalism has already been realized. A year ago, Coalition troops and Afghans were engaged in real combat. Iraq, which has provided training to Al Qaeda in chemical weaponry, is next on the list — and there will be a war there too. Canada, which is at as much risk as any other Western nation from Al Qaeda, will have to offer real support for this war too. More engagements may come in the near future too — it is entirely possible to imagine situations in which Western troops will take active roles in other Muslim nations over the next couple of decades.

Islamic Fundamentalism is an ideological opponent just as the Nazis and Communists were… and we did not survive the threats they offered by being apologetic, culturally sensitive, and passive in the war of opinion, information and propaganda that attended 20^th Century Wars. This dimension of the war is one that cannot be neglected either.

Yet, in Canada, we have been tardy and hesitant in taking the domestic measures we need to take to limit the threat, our military is in appalling shape, and we have not even begun to recognize the full extent of the challenge that awaits us. The War against Islamic Fundamentalism will last for decades, and it is even possible that we can lose it. Failure to recognize the seriousness of this threat is ‘Moronic’, and there is ample evidence that Moronic behavior is plentiful in Canada.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: institute@mackenzieinstitute.com

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