Asymmetrical Warfare on Balance

by John Thompson

September 2, 2002

Most of you might not have yet heard the term ‘Asymmetrical Warfare’, but you will. All the defence ministries and foreign chancelleries of the Western World use this new catchphrase; politicians act familiar with it, and many think-tanks toss the phrase about. The term might not get adopted by the business community, but other activities and relationships could soon find an ‘asymmetric’ tag being affixed to them. Eventually, David Letterman will make a top-ten list about things that sound ‘asymmetrical but really aren’t.’

Alas, like many phrases, more people claim to be familiar with its meaning than they really are. Also, like so many nebulous ideas such as ‘social justice’ or ‘interactive paradigm’ or ‘quantum change’, concepts of asymmetry will probably be routinely misused or casually misinterpreted.

It might be time to nail ‘Asymmetrical Warfare’ firmly to the floor before it ends up flopping all over the place.

Asymmetrical Warfare refers to terrorism and its related forms of conflict such as insurgency, guerrilla operations and other activities that had been loosely described in earlier decades as "low intensity" operations. It refers to the acute imbalance that takes place when a terrorist or insurgent confronts a government.

While warfare is never truly ‘symmetrical’, most of us tend to think of it in a framework first described by one of the 19^th Century’s more formidable soldier-scholars, Karl Von Clausewitz. He wrote of war as applied violence undertaken between Nation-States, which he thought of as a ‘trinity’ wherein a government used its military with the support of its people against a similar trinity.

This sort of war can be extremely destructive and bloody, which is why we are so afraid of it, because both sides can--and have--used every resource available to them to wage war with all the strength they can muster. In the Second World War, for example, there were almost no constraints on our behavior towards enemy combatants, while our enemies (and our Soviet ally) had few qualms about their behaviour to helpless civilians either. Moreover, the industrialized nation states, particularly Western ones, are extremely good at fighting conventional wars.

Asymmetrical warfare is about conflict where this trinity does not exist on one side. The Al-Qaeda network, for example, has no government, not much of a military, and is drawn from the restive elements within many different peoples. There are many groups like this. In contrast to the vast powers available to a modern nation state, a group of terrorists have very little in the way of tangible resources--this makes conflict between the two ‘asymmetric’.

But there are forms of asymmetry too. Liberal democracies have many restraints on their behaviour and abilities; they cannot use their powers freely without endangering the consensual relationship that lies at the heart of our societies. Terrorists and insurgents have no such limitations. This leads to an imbalance where the attacking group is free to use every gun, bomb or chemical weapon they can get their hands on while the nation they attack is extremely constrained in the use of its power. Worse still, terrorists and insurgents conceal their presence by hiding among larger groups of innocent people so that they can deny easy opportunities for retaliation to the nation that they have outraged.

The third asymmetric aspect to this relationship also lies with opportunity. Terrorism is a symbolic form of warfare characterized by an old Chinese expression "Kill one, frighten 10,000." One hijacked airliner puts a chill into 10,000 flights around the world; one suicide attacker on a commuter bus makes 10,000 busloads of passengers apprehensive. All the attacker has to do is attack an airliner or a bus when he chooses whereas 10,000 highly visible airliners and buses have to be protected all the time.

The fourth form of asymmetry lies with our standards of judgment--so clearly evident when Israel responded to Palestinian terrorism this past spring. It was obvious that Israel’s least action was being judged to a much higher standard than any of the casual mass-homicides undertaken by the Palestinians.

Apologists for various terrorists often portray their acts as a righteous use of violence by the weak against the strong. This is utterly false. In terms of gross power, the terrorist is always outmatched by the state. In terms of vulnerability, initiative, and expectations of moral behavior, the state is always vulnerable to the terrorist. Thus, in terms of the useable power of ‘Asymmetrical Warfare,’ the boot is firmly on the terrorist’s foot.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: institute@mackenzieinstitute.com

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